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Abstract 
This note provides an analysis of Iranian economy in its post-revolution era with 
special emphasis on the country’s banking sector and discusses the reasons for Iran’s 
failure in reaching sustained economic growth and financial development. 
1. Introduction 
This note provides an analysis of Iranian economy in its post-revolution era with 
special emphasis on the country’s banking sector and discusses the reasons for Iran’s 
failure in reaching sustained economic growth. These problems are interesting for 
any Iranian and foreign researcher as Iran is a rich country with abundant natural 
resources. An analysis of the economic problems of Iran and the impact of 
government and foreign policies on economic indicators seems necessary to identify 
the factors which prevent economic and financial development in Iran. This note 
discusses that some of the government policies, which hinder the economic growth 
and financial development in Iran should be removed or revised, especially those 
policies which are known as financial repression and those that may decrease the 
efficiency of financial sector and consequently inhibit financial development and 
economic growth. 
2. An Analysis of the Iranian E
Iran has a young population
2009), Iran has a population of 
and Iran’s health and education levels are one of the best in the region. At the same 
time, the number of women participation in the labor market force continues to 
increase in this society with a large number of young people with high level of 
education. Hence, one of the most challenging problems in Iranian economy is to 
facilitate and create new jobs for those who are ready to enter the labor market 
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           Figure 2: Unemployment rate (% of total labour force) in Iran, 1981-2007 
                Source: World Bank World Development Indicators 
With a brief review of economy of Iran, especially after 1960, we can easily identify 
that Iran’s economy has experienced many periods of high inflation, stagnation, 
expansion and recession. In the period of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi Kingdom, 
with the policy focus on the oil sector, the sale of oil was very beneficial for the 
government in terms of budget revenue as well as for the economy as a whole. 
During the 1960s, the economy of Iran has experienced almost its best time. The rate 
of economic growth was quite high in this decade. The IMF Country Report (2004) 
states that during 1960-1976, the rate of growth of Iranian economy was the fastest in 
the world with a real economic growth rate of 9.8 on average and a real per capita 
income growth of 7 percent on average.  
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Islamic revolution, during the war between Iran and Iraq
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plunged into a crisis.2
                                        
1
 As reported by Alizadeh (2000), during the 1960s and the early1970s, Iran’s GDP and consumption 
rates were between the ranges of 10
growth was even faster and the government spent much of its revenue from oil on the public 
investment and consumption .During the same period, the government expenditure on public 
investment exceeded the private investment by 50%, and the public consumption was 50% of private 
consumption (Alizadeh, 2000).
2
 The world faced three major oil shocks in the last three decades: 1973
Israeli-war), 1979-1980 (Iranian revolution an
of Kuwait and the Gulf War) (RIS, 2004).
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Figure 4: Oil price per barrel (US dollars) in Iran, 1960-2005 
Source: www.inflationdata.com/inflation/Inflation_Rate/ 
Historical_Oil_Prices_Table.asp 
Regarding the price of oil per barrel, as shown in Figure 4, oil prices were stable 
starting from 1960 around $3  per barrel until 1972, and then it has fluctuated widely 
till 2007. These fluctuations have been between a range of $5 and $65 per barrel. 
This instability has not been favorable for the Iranian economy, which is an exporter 
of oil. 
Between 1977 and 1988, Iran experienced its Islamic revolution and the Iran-Iraq 
war, which have had significant negative impact on the country’s economy, reversing 
the direction of economic growth (Ilias, 2008). 
Ilias (2008) states that Islamic revolution which occurred in 1979 changed the 
economic history of Iran and also its modern political history. She argues that Iran’s 
economy changed into a public sector-dominated economy and, during the eight 
years of war between Iran and Iraq, the economy of Iran suffered to a great extent 
(Ilias, 2008).  
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After the Iran and Iraq war, the Iranian government tried to restructure and rebuild 
the economy, which was damaged during the war. It also tried to redistribute the 
wealth by a series of Five-Year Development Plans. For this purpose, they removed 
the allotments and subventions after 1989 through changes on the rules of the 
exchange rates and prices. Moreover, the size of government participation in the 
economy was reduced by privatization between the years 1989 and1993. As the 
Iranian government tried hard to reconstruct and recover the oil production, the 
growth reached an annual average of 4.7 percent between the years 1989-2002 (see 
Figure 3). Although this period was marked by frequent fluctuations in growth rate, 
the economy was affected by a decline during 1993-1994 when the price of oil 
decreased significantly due to the economic boycott (see Figure 4). The crisis of debt 
with improper policies had a great detrimental effect on growth by a 3.6 percent fall 
during the years 1995-2000 (IMF, 2004). Subsequently, in the third Five-Year 
Development Plan, the Iranian economy had an impressive development: By the year 
2005, the government successfully smoothed the path of exports and consolidated 
exchange rates (Salarpour, 2007). 
During 2007-2008, progress was significant and, in the face of fast expansion of the 
labor force, unemployment decreased (see Figure 2). Since 2005-2006, economic 
growth of the non-oil sector increased by 7.3 percent. The oil sector, nevertheless, 
registered only little development caused by inadequate foreign investment in 2007-
2008 (IMF, 2008). 
Parallel to these developments, inflation rate has been relatively stable in the last 
decade. As can be seen from the graph of inflation in Figure 5, inflation rate 
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fluctuated widely from 1980 to 2007. This fluctuation has been approximately 
between a range of 4.37 percent and 49.11 percent. 
 
Figure 5: Inflation rate (Annual %) in Iran 
Source: International Monetary Policy and World Bank Country Data’s 
3. Financial Development in Iran 
One of the main barriers to economic and financial development in Iran is the 
shortage of adequate productive investment. Increasing competency of financial 
market and improving the position of financial growth may solve these 
complications. However, financial markets in Iran are not uniform and organized. 
Significant shares of savings are transmitted to borrowers via unauthorized market 
and economy. Due to financing with poor-quality loans, most of the investment 
projects are not profitable. Furthermore, a large volume of credits allocated to private 
sector are channeled by direct command of the government (Taghavi and 
Ismailzadeh, 2009).  
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One of the economic policies of the Iranian government has been to inculpate 
private-public proprietorship system of the banking sector of the pre-revolution 
period and to accomplish nationalization of the sector. As the banking system is 
directed by the tight control of the government, it has a number of limitations 
regarding interest rate and on branch expansion (Hosseini and Shabbani, 2003). 
After the 1979 Islamic Revolution, financial system of Iran has developed in 
different periods. In early 1980s, it experienced widespread nationalization. In 1990s, 
it experienced a reconstruction of the financial system, concentrating on reforming 
the regulatory conditions (Taghipour, 2009). For instance, during the years 1995-
2000, in the Second Five-Year Development Plan, the improvement concentrated on 
placing an interest rate on bank deposits at a position that guaranteed positive real 
returns, giving out investment certificates, and motivating the existence of individual 
credit institutions. Moreover, in the Third Five-Year Development Plan during the 
years 2000-2005, the reconstruction concentrated on reducing the use of executive 
controls on interest rates and credit apportionment, reinvestment of the state banks by 
issuing securities, and the establishment of private banks and non-bank credit 
organizations. Despite these improvements, the policies were not sufficient to loose 
up financial repression in Iran (Taghipour, 2009).  
Table 1 presents the average data for every 10 years between the years 1960 and 
2007 on leading financial and economical variables. 
 
 
 
 
              
 
             Table 1: Banking Sector and Macroeconomic Indicators in Iran 
           Years     
  1960-1970 1970-1980 1980-1990 1990-2000 2000-2007 
CPI (% ) 2.55 0.00 19.82 23.71 11.39 
GDP growth (annual %) 11.62 11.00 -0.31 4.64 4.69 
GDP per capita growth (annual %)  8.51 2.88 -3.66 2.91 4.87 
M2 as % of GDP 25.19 31.06 49.87 39.62 38.99 
 Deposit Money Banks: Assets (Millions US Dollars) 45.31 529.74 2003.08 3285.38 18946.31 
Deposit Money Banks: Liabilities (Millions US Dollars) 22.28 776.52 885.44 3215.28 18714.94 
Reserves (Billions Rials) 17.46 181.29 2966.02 22396.44 97467.76 
Foreign Assets (Net)(Billions Rials) 16.53 422.51 780.10 5933.61 180179.38 
Domestic Credit (Billions Rials) 119.99 975.89 10436.32 81803.45 505973.38 
Cash (Billions Rials) 1.84 13.39 42.39 616.64 12199.65 
Demand Deposits (Billions Rials) 4.23 30.42 127.63 1754.57 16488.95 
Private Sector Deposits (Billions Rials) 2.70 11.31 125.50 1754.57 16487.95 
Time And Savings Deposits (Billions Rials)  2.00 33.22 320.57 3730.76 75938.84 
Deposit Rate - 8.07 7.38 11.11 11.66 
Lending Rate  - 12.07 10.43 17.40 14.66 
Source: International Monetary Policy and World Bank Country Data 
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4. Banking Sector in Iran 
According to RSM International (2008), there are approximately 17 commercial banks in Iran 
today. Among these banks, eleven of them are state-owned and six of them are privately owned. 
All of these banks have to follow the principles of Islamic banking whereby usury is not allowed 
and, beside to interest rates, profit rates are set on deposits and expected rates of profit on 
facilities are set on loans. The banking sector is dominated by Bank Melli Iran (National Bank of 
Iran) in terms of both capital and asset size. 
Currently, six banks which are privately owned, Bank Persian, Bank Kafarin, Bank Saman, Bank 
Pasargad, Bank Eqtesad-e-Novin, Bank Sina and Bank Sarmaye were the first banks to start 
operations in Iran after the nationalization of the banking sector in 1952. Some policies have 
been introduced to reform the structure of financial sector by privatizing the majority of Iran’s 
state-owned banks. Nevertheless, the privatization process is restricted to domestic investors, and 
the state proposes to keep a 30% stake of the overall banking sector (RSM International, 2008). 
In Iran, following to the completion of landmark reforms in the financial sector, banking sector 
has witnessed large changes with the elimination of bureaucratic controls, encouragement to 
foreign private and private investment and integrating the Iran's banking systems with the 
international economy. The entry of new private banks constitute a challenge to the public sector 
bank leadership in Iran (Ahangar, 2009). 
The Iranian Government obliges the Central Bank to use specific monetary policies in support of 
catering for their current affairs and fiscal policy. Thus, usually the money supply stays out of 
control of the Central Bank. In determining the quantity of money, the most significant factors 
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are how the monetary base is controlled and the ways the money is supplied (Naghshineh-pour, 
2009).3  
Even though the mix of private and state banking in Iran may be considered as a structural 
problem, it is ideo-politically driven (Naghshineh-pour, 2009). There is still a big deal which 
supports the establishment of state banking that prevents healthy competition, although 
privatization of the majority of the state owned banks is on the agenda. All private banks were 
nationalized after the revolution. Private banking restarted its activity again only eight years ago 
and its growth has been considerably fast (Naghshineh-pour, 2009).  
At the moment the market share of private banks is 22% (in terms of asset) of the whole market. 
Their performance and productivity are significantly higher than those of the state banks. 
Nevertheless, they are subject to anti-competitive interference in their affairs constantly by the 
government and the Central Bank to prevent their fast market share growth. Additionally, state 
owned banks can slash the private-owned banks’ profitability, since they tend to care less about 
profits. Besides, they receive a large number of unfair benefits from the Central Bank 
(Naghshineh-pour, 2009). Based on international standards, Iran does not have an adequate 
number of private banks compared to the number of state-run banks. There are fewer private 
banks in Iran than that of developed countries because of the loss of a competitive state of affairs 
in the country (Naghshineh-pour, 2009). Recently, the average real interest rate has been either 
close to zero or negative. Therefore, depositors have fewer intensive to save and have more 
tendencies to spend. They allocate their capital in gold, real estate, and durable goods to avoid 
                                                 
3
 The monetary base consists of the government’s debts to the Central Bank, the net amount of Central Bank’s 
foreign assets, financial institutions’ and commercial banks’ debts to the Central Bank, and other assets of the 
Central Bank (Naghshineh-pour, 2009). 
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depreciation of their money. In contrast, negative real interest rates increase the demand for 
borrowing in the banking system (Naghshineh-pour, 2009).  
Currently, under the command of the government, the banks are converted into a tool for 
distributing credit with no consider to economic wisdom and to the profitability of the 
investments. Consequently, the banks are at the risk of credit defaults. This policy has 
significantly decreased the level of efficiency of the banking system and has imposed on the 
economy high costs (Naghshineh-pour, 2009).  
The Central Bank of Islamic Republic of Iran (CBI) was set up in 1960, and is in charge of 
formulating and implementation of the fiscal and credit policies. In line with the common 
economic policy of the country, four main goals of central bank of Iran are; (1) Preserving the 
value of national currency; (2) Preserving the stability of the balance of payments; (3) Smoothing 
the path of trade-related transactions; and (4) Developing the potential expansion of the country 
(CBI, 2009). 
According to CBI (2009), the financial institutions in Iran include the following: (1) The banks 
which are authorized by government and the banks which are nongovernmental; (2) The credit 
organizations which get the permission from Central Bank of Iran; (3) Money dealers which are 
accredited, as well as charitable lending funds; and (4) Cooperative funds and cooperative credit 
firms (CBI, 2009). 
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In the guideline of Central Bank of Iran for banking sector, it is stated that Central Bank of Iran 
has the option to meddle in and control fiscal and banking affairs to ensure the performance of 
the fiscal system. Some of these actions have been listed as follows:  
First, clearing the formal loan interest rates and rediscount rate, which may differ on the basis of 
the type of bill and loan or document.  
Second, for different aspects of banks according to their performances or on the basis of other 
standards at its own, setting the ratio of the bank's liquid assets to their total assets or to their 
different types of liabilities.  
Third, the ratios and the rates of interest should be payable on the lawful deposits of banks at the 
central Bank of Iran. The mentioned ratios may be different according to the formats and 
performances of the banks, but it will never decrease below 10 percent and increase over 30 
percent.  
Fourth, identifying the upper and lower rates of interest. Fifth, setting the proportion of the total 
amount of paid up reserves and capital of banks to their various categories of assets. 
Sixth, determining the highest amount of obligation on the part of banks issuing letters of credit, 
and, the kind and amount of commitment for such obligations. 
Seventh, setting the periods and conditions relating to hire-purchase negotiations financed by 
banks. 
14 
 
Eighth, determining the kinds and amounts of awards and other encouragements recommended 
by banks to absorb savings or current deposits also regulations relating to public interests in this 
regard.  
Ninth, restraining the operations of banks to one or more specific sectors of performance either 
temporarily or permanently. 
Tenth, determining methods in which banks savings and deposits are utilized. 
Eleventh, setting the maximum amount of credits and loans granted by banks or the maximum 
amount of their credits and loans in particular fields. Lastly, applying these rules, which are 
mentioned above, to credit institutions and systematizing regulations for them.4 
5. Conclusion 
This note has provided an analysis of Iranian economy in its post-revolution era with special 
emphasis on the country’s banking sector and has discussed the reasons for Iran’s failure in 
reaching sustained economic growth. It also indicates that some of the government policies, 
which hinder the economic growth and financial development in Iran, should be removed or 
revised, especially those policies which are known as financial repression and those that may 
decrease the efficiency of financial sector and consequently inhibit financial development and 
economic growth. 
 
 
                                                 
4
 For full list see: www.cbi.ir/page/BankingStudiesRegulations_en.aspx 
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